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For archives and proofs
that the Palestinians were ethnically cleansed
from Palestine in 1948-1949.
Plan Dalet: the Conquest of Palestine and Expulsion
of the Palestinians
Walid
Khalidi's From
Haven to Conquest has a copy of the Plan
Dalet reproduced in its text. I have reproduced it
below. Several links are also provided. Plan Dalet
very well known and well documented. According to
Yehoshua Porath, who has been described as the
preeminent Israeli scholar on Palestinian
nationalism, the Plant Dalet was made public in
Israel in 1972 as an appendix to the semiofficial
History of the
Haganah.
You can
also see Netanel Lorch's
The Edge of the
Sword: Israel's War of Independence 1947-1949
(New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1961) pp. 87-89; J.
Bowyer Bell,
Terror Out of Zion (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1977) pp. 290-313; Walid Khalidi, "The
Plan Dalet, "
Middle East Form , November 1961. This
last information is taken from my critique of Joan
Peter's book
From Time Immemorial published in American
Arab Affairs, (now
Middle East Policy)
Fall 1986, pp.77-91.
My
article also discusses other documentation on the
expulsion of the Palestinians much of it provided by
Benny Morris, although he does not draw the obvious
conclusions until much later when he decided to
openly support the ethnic cleansing of Palestine and
complained that Ben Gurion did not go far enough. If
anyone is interested I can provide a copy of my
critique of Joan Peter's book
From Time
Immemorial.
Ed Corrigan
Other sources on the Plan Dalet
W.
Khalidi, (Ed.),
All That Remains, the Palestinian Villages Occupied
and Depopulated by Israel in 1948,(
Washington, D.C: Institute for Palestine Studies,.
1992.)
W.
Khalidi, `Plan Dalet: Master Plan for the Conquest
of Palestine,
Journal of Palestine
Studies,
Vol. XVIII, No. 1, Autumn 1988, pp.3-70.
W.
Khalidi, Ed.,
From Haven to Conquest, (Washington, D.C:
the Institute of Palestine Studies,., Reprint 1987).
Historical Documents
Plan Dalet (10 March 1948)
The
Zionist forces started the war in early
April 1948 by launching Plan Dalet. Plan
Dalet was launched to conquer and ethnically
cleanse the country and was not a defence
against an Arab invasion. The Arab armies
did not enter Palestine until after the
British left on 15 May. When they entered,
it was too late. The Zionists had already
conquered a major part of the country and
driven out most of its inhabitants. Entry of
the Arab armies did not make any difference.
The text that follows is translated from
Sefer=2 0Toldot Hahaganah [History of the
Haganah], vol. 3, ed, by Yehuda Slutsky (TelAviv:
Zionist Library, 1972), Appendix 48, pp
1955-60.
1. Introduction
(a) The objective of this plan is to gain
control of the areas of the Hebrew state and
defend its borders.
It also aims at gaining control of the areas
of Jewish settlement and concentration which
are located outside the borders [of the
Hebrew state] against regular, semi-regular,
and small forces operating from bases
outside or inside the state.
(b) This plan is based on three previous
plans:
1. Plan B, September 1945.
2. The May 1946 Plan.
3. Yehoshua Plan, 1948
(c) Since these plans were designed to deal
with the situation inside the country (the
first two plans deal with the first phase of
incidents, while the third plan deals with
the possibility of invasion by regular
armies from the neighboring countries), the
aim of Plan D is to fill the gaps in the
previous three plans and to make them more
suitable for the situation expected to
obtain at the end of British rule in the
country.
2. Basic Assumptions
This plan is based on the following basic
assumptions:
(a) The Enemy
1. Expected composition of forces:
The semi-regular forces of the Liberation
Army affiliated with the Arab League, which
operate from already occupied bases or bases
to be occupied in the future.
The regular forces of neighboring countries,
which will launch an invasion across the
borders, or will operate from bases inside
the country (the Arab Legion ).
Small local forces which operate, or will
operate, from bases inside the country and
within the borders of the Hebrew state.
All three forces will be activated at the
same time in accordance with a joint
operational plan, and will sometimes engage
in tactical coordination.
2. Actual operations expected from the enemy'
.
Isolation and, if possible, occupation of
the eastern Galilee, western Galilee, and
the Negev.
Infiltration into the heart of the area of
Sharon and Emek Hefer'. in the direction of
Qalqiliyyah-Herzliya and
Tulkarm-Netanya, roughly.
Isolation of t he three major cities
(especially Tel Aviv). ).
Disruption of food supply lines and other
vital services such as water, electricity,
etc.
3. Expected tactical methods:
Attacks by the regular and semi-regular
forces on settlements, using heavy infantry
weapons, as well as field artillery, armored
vehicles, and the air force.
Air strikes against centers within our
cities (especially Tel Aviv)
Harassment operations carried out by small
forces against transportation arteries and
settlements to give the operations mentioned
above direct or tactical support. These
forces will also carry out sabotage
operations against vital economic facilities
and terrorist raids within cities.
(b) The Authorities
This plan rests on the general assumption
that during its implementation, the forces
of the [British] authorities will not be
present in the country.
In the event that British forces continue to
control certain bases and areas, the plan
must be modified to deal with this situation
in these areas. Additional instructions will
be issued in this regard.
(c) International Forces
This plan rests on the assumption that there
will be no internationalforces stationed in
the country which a re capable of effective
action,
(d) Operational Objectives
1. Self-defense against invasion by regular
or semi-regular forces. This will be
achieved by the following:
A fixed defensive system to preserve our
settlements, vital economic projects, and
property, which will enable us to provide
governmental services within the borders of
the state (based on defending the regions of
the state on the one hand. and on blocking
the main access routes from enemy territory
to the territory of the state. on the
other).
Launching pre-planned counter-attacks on
enemy bases and supply lines in the heart of
his territory. whether within the borders of
the country [Palestine] or in neighboring
countries.
2. Ensuring freedom of military and economic
activity within the borders of the [Hebrew]
state and in Jewish settlements outside its
borders by occupying and controlling
important high-ground positions on a number
of transportation arteries.
3. Preventing the enemy from using frontline
positions within his territory which can
easily be used for launching attacks. This
will be effected by occupying and
controlling them.
4. Applying economic pressure on the enemy
by besieging some of his cities in order to
fo rce him to abandon some of his activities
in certain areas of the country.
5. Restricting the capability of the enemy
by carrying out limited operations:
occupation and control of certain of his
bases in rural and urban areas within the
borders of the state.
6. Controlling government services and
property within the borders of the state and
ensuring the supply of essential public
services in an effective manner.
3. Assignment of Duties
In view of the operational objectives
outlined above, the various armed services
are assigned the following duties:
(1) Strengthening the fixed defensive system
designed to defend the zones, and
coordinating its deployment on the regional
level. In addition, the main enemy access
routes to the lands of the state must be
blocked through appropriate operations and
measures.
(2) Consolidation of the defensive
apparatus.
(3) Deployment in major cities.
(4) Control of the main transportation
arteries country-wide.
(5) Encirclement of enemy cities.
(6) Occupation and control of frontline
enemy positions.
(7) Counterattacks inside and outside the
borders of the country.
(a) The Fixed Defensive System
1.The fixed defensive20system in rural areas
depends on two main factors: using protected
areas for the purpose of defending the
circumference, on the one hand, and blocking
main transportation routes used by the
enemy, on the other hand.
2. The security arrangements pertaining to
the zones in rural areas, originally
designed to repel small enemy forces, must
be modified in terms of planning and
reinforcement to suit the tactical measures
expected to be employed by semi-regular or
regular enemy forces. This will be effected
according to instructions issued by the
operations branch in charge of defense and
planning in rural areas.
3. In addition, if we take into
consideration the tactical measures expected
to be employed by the enemy, efforts must be
made to make a transition from a positional
defense to a regional defense, so that the
unit of defense is the region and not the
zone.
4, In order to achieve this objective, the
following steps must be taken:
a) Transformation of the regional staff from
an administrative staff to a general staff
(selection of a location, setting up a
communications network, etc.)
b) Formation of a regional mobile reserve,
to be recruited from the forces appointed to
the zones, which would reinforce the forces
or carry out counterstrikes in the zones
within each region according to pre-arranged
plans.
c) Adaptation and incorporation of the plans
concerning fortification and opening fire in
the zones to those of the region, as far as
possible, taking into consideration
geographical circumstances and types of
weapons used. These plans must also be
coordinated with the operations of the
regional mobile reserves.
5. Settlements which because of their
geographical location cannot be included in
a fixed regional defense plan must be
organized into local defense zones.
Accordingly, they must be equipped to block
transport roads used by the enemy, or if
tactical circumstances permit, to control
the heights, setting up fortifications and
barricades and laying mines, etc. This will
be done in addition to activating the zone's
defensive apparatus. Additional forces must
be assigned to carry out these duties, as
will be detailed below. These specifications
also apply to isolated regions.
6. Blocking the main enemy transportation
routes.
a) The main enemy transportation routes
which link his lands to the lands of the
state, such as roads, bridges, main passes,
important crossroads, paths, etc. must be
blocked by means of: acts of sabotage,
explosions, series of barricades, mine
fields, as well as by controlling the
elevations near roads and taking up
positions there.
b) A system of barricades must be set up in
addition to the fixed defensive system. The
tactical plans concerning barricades must be
adapted to and coordinated with the
defensive plans concerning the zones located
near these barricades. They must also be
coordinated with the regional defense plans
if this is possible from the geographical
point of view.
(b) Consolidation of Defense Systems and
Fortifications
The following operations must be carried out
if the fixed defensive system is to be
effective and if the rear of this system is
to be protected:
1. Occupation of police stations.
2. Control of government installations and
provision of services in each and every
region.
3. Protection of secondary transportation
arteries.
4. Mounting operations against enemy
population centers located inside or near
our defensive system in order to prevent
them from being used as bases by an active
armed force. These operations can be divided
into the following categories:
Destruction of villages (setting fire to,
blowing up, and planting mines in the debri
s), especially those population centers
which are difficult to control continuously.
Mounting search and control operations
according to the following guidelines:
encirclement of the village and conducting a
search inside it. In the event of
resistance, the. armed force must be
destroyed and the population must be
expelled outside the borders of the state.
The villages which are emptied in the manner
described above must be included in the
fixed defensive system and must be fortified
as necessary.
In the absence of resistance, garrison
troops will enter the village and take up
positions in it or in locations which enable
complete tactical control. The officer in
command of the unit will confiscate all
weapons, wireless devices, and motor
vehicles in the village. In addition, he
will detain all politically suspect
individuals. After consultation with the
[Jewish] political authorities, bodies will
be appointed consisting of people from the
village to administer the internal affairs
of the village. In every region, a Uewish]
person will be appointed to be responsible
for arranging the political and
administrative affairs of all [Arab]
villages and population centers which are
occupied within that region.
(c) Deployment in Maj or Cities
Positions will be taken in the large cities
according to the following principles:
1. Occupation and control of government
facilities and property (post offices,
telephone exchanges, railroad stations,
police stations, harbors, etc. )
2. Protection of all vital public services
and installations.
3. Occupation and control of all isolated
Arab neighborhoods located between our
municipal center and the Arab municipal
center, especially those neighborhoods which
control the city's exit and entry roads.
These neighborhoods will be controlled
according to the guidelines set for
searching villages. In case of resistance,
the population will be expelled to the area
of the Arab municipal center.
4. Encirclement of the central Arab
municipal area and its isolation from
external transportation routes, as well as
the termination of its vital services
(water, electricity, fuel, etc.), as far as
possible. ,
(d) Control of Main Transportation Arteries
on the Regional Level
1. Occupation and control of locations which
overlook main regional transportation
arteries, such as police stations, water
pumps, etc. These elevated locations will be
transformed into fortified surveillance
posts to be used, when the need aris es, as
bases for a mobile defensive force. (In many
cases, this operation will be coordinated
with the occupation of police stations,
which aims at consolidating the fixed
defensive system.)
2. Occupation and control of Arab villages
which constitute a serious obstruction on
any of the main transportation arteries.
Operations against these villages will be
carried out according to the specifications
given under the item pertaining to the
searching of villages.
(e) Enemy Cities Will Be Besieged according
to the Following Guidelines:
1. By isolating them from transportation
arteries by laying mines, blowing up
bridges, and a system of fixed ambushes.
2. If necessary, by occupying high points
which overlook transportation arteries
leading to enemy cities, and the
fortification of our units in these
positions.
3. By disrupting vital services, such as
electricity, water, and fuel, or by using
economic resources available to us. or by
sabotage.
4. By launching a naval operation against
the cities that can receive supplies by sea,
in order to destroy the vessels carrying the
provisions, as well as by carrying out acts
of sabotage against harbor facilities.
(f) Occupation and Control of Front line Ene
my Positions
Generally, the aim of this plan is not an
operation of occupation outside the borders
of the Hebrew state. However, concerning
enemy bases lying directly close to the
borders which may be used as springboards
for infiltration into the territory of the
state, these must be temporarily occupied
and searched for hostiles according to the
above guidelines, and they must then be
incorporated into our defensive system until
operations cease.
Bases located in enemy territory which are
intended to be temporarily occupied and
controlled will be listed among the
operational targets for the various
brigades.
(g) Counterattacks Inside and Outside the
Borders of the State
Counterattacks will be used as ancillary
measures for the fixed defensive system in
order to abort the organized attacks
launched by semi-regular and regular enemy
forces, whether from bases inside the
country or from outside the borders.
Counterattacks will be launched according to
the following guidelines:
1. Diversionary attacks; i.e., while the
enemy is launching an attack against one of
our areas, [our forces will launch] a
counterattack deep inside another area
controlled by the enemy with the aim of
diverting his forces in the 20direction of
the counterattack.
2. Striking at transportation and supply
routes deep inside enemy territory,
especially against a regular enemy force
which is invading from across the border.
3. Attacking enemy bases in his rear, both
inside the country [Palestine] and across
its borders.
4. Counterattacks will generally proceed as
follows: a force the size of a battalion, on
average, will carry out a deep infiltration
and will launch concentrated attacks against
population centers and enemy bases with the
aim of destroying them along with the enemy
force positioned there;
alternatively, this force may split up to
carry out secondary operations, such as acts
of sabotage and diversion on the enemy's
military transportation routes and arteries.
5. A detailed list of counterattacks will be
included in the [list of] operational
targets. of the Strategic Mobile Force
[PALMACH].
4. Duties of the Armed Services
(a) Allocation of duties in the fixed
defensive system:
1. The following duties are the
responsibility of the Garrison Force [KHIM],
defense of the zones and of isolated and
fortified posts and formation of the
regional reserves.
2. Within the framework of the fixed defens
ive system, the Field Force [KHISH]. are
responsible for the following duties:
Operations to block enemy transportation
routes. For this purpose,every blocking
operation will be assigned, on the basis of
its importance and type, a specified Field
Force unit whose size is appropriate to the
nature of the mission.
In addition, the Field Force brigade in
question will be responsible for duties
related to consolidating the fixed defensive
system, as outlined in section 3 (b).
3. In special and exceptional circumstances,
Field Force units may be positioned in the
regions or zones, or in isolated and
fortified positions, in order to reinforce
zonal or regional defense. Efforts must be
made to decrease the number of such cases,
as far as possible.
4. In addition to the duties detailed above,
the Field Force's responsibilities within
the fixed defensive system generally consist
in mounting local counterattacks involving
units no smaller than company (larger units
should be used if possible) against enemy
units while they are attacking the fixed
defensive system in order to block their
lines of retreat and destroy them. These
counterattacks will usually be launched from
fixed operational bases which will be
specified for the =2 0Field Force in the
context of the duties for which it is
responsible in the region as a whole. These
instructions require that the Field Force
units be concentrated as much as possible,
and not be divided up into secondary units.
5. The chain of command in the cases
mentioned above will be in accordance with
Addendum 1 to the Order concerning Regional
Infrastructure, November 1947.
6. If the blocking system (which the Field
Force is responsible for defending) is
incorporated into the zonal or regional
defensive system, the commander of the Field
Force battalion concerned will appoint the
commander in charge of the entire defensive
system.
(b) In addition to the duties assigned to
the Field Force brigade in question
concerning the consolidation of the fixed
defensive system, the brigade will also
carry out the following duties:
Consolidation of positions in the cities.
Control of main transportation arteries
country-wide.
Encirclement of enemy cities.
Occupation and control of enemy frontline
positions. This will be effected in
accordance with the operational duties
assigned to the various Field Force
brigades.
In order to carry out any or all of these
duties, the supreme command can a ssign
units of the Strategic Mobile Force
[PALMACH], which constitute the country-wide
reserves, to the Field Force.
2. During the implementation of joint
missions with the Field Force, units of the
Strategic Mobile Force [P ALMACH] will fall
under the command of the Field Force brigade
that controls the area in which these units
are operating.
3. After completion of the mission, the
units of the Strategic Mobile Force [P
ALMACH] will rejoin the country-wide
reserves.
4. Efforts must be made to ensure that the
period during which units of the
country-wide reserves are assigned to the
Field Force is as short as possible.
(c) 1. The Strategic Mobile Force [PALMACH]
is responsible for carrying out
counterattacks inside and outside the
borders of the country.
2. The supreme command may reduce the number
of duties assigned to one or another of the
Field Force brigades as it sees fit ( i.e.
those related to the siege of enemy cities,
control of transportation routes and
occupation of frontline positions) and
allocate them directly to the Strategic
Mobile Force [PALMACH] instead.
(d) The various departments and services of
the general staff are required to complete
the above planning orders in their =2 0
various areas of responsibility and to
present the plans to the Field Force
brigades.
Notes:
1. This is Plan Gimmel or Plan C.
2. This is an early version of Plan D, so
called after Yehoshua Globerman, a Haganah
commander killed in early December 1947.
Plan D itself was finalized on 10 March,
1948.
3. This was a British-commanded and financed
army of King 'Abdallah's Transjordan, units
of which served in Palestine under British
army orders until the end of the mandate on
15 May 1948. .
4. Sharon is the coastal plain between Haifa
and Tel Aviv, Emek Hefer being its central
section (in Arabic Wadi al-Hawarith).
5. The two others are Jerusalem and Haifa.
6. These "police stations" were in fact
fortresses, fifty of which were built by the
British throughout Palestine after the Arab
rebellion of 1936-39 in order to control the
Arab population.
7. In the original translation, the word
`srika' was translated as "combing." The
reference is to a search for hostile forces.
8. This list is not in the Hebrew original
of this document.
9. [KHIM ] is short for Khayl Matzav, the
second line troops. By fall 1947, they numbe
red about 32,000. See Khalidi, From Haven to
Conquest, 862. {Israeli sources give much
lower numbers - A.I.)
10. KHISH is short for Khayl Sadeh, the
front line troops. By I May 1948, they
numbered about 30,000. See Khalidi, From
Haven to Conquest, 861.{Israeli sources give
much lower numbers - A.I.)
11. See Appendix C, below (A.I. - Not
included in the Web version ).
12. PALMACH is short for Plugot Machats,
i.e., crushing battalions. By spring 1948.
this force was made up of three brigades
(Yiftach, Harel, and HaNegev) numbering just
above 8,000 men. See Walid Khalidi, From
Haven to Conquest (Washington: Institute for
Palestine Studies, 1987), 861. (The Palmach
was originally formed with the intention of
repelling an invasion from Vichy-controlled
Syria - A.I.)
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